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CONCLUSION
Good advertising does not just circulate information.
It penetrates the public mind with desires and belief.
—Leo Burnett1
INTRODUCTION
In July 2011, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) in the
United Kingdom banned two cosmetics advertisements.2 One was
for a makeup foundation called “Teint Miracle” by Lancome, and
the other was for a foundation called “The Eraser” by Maybelline.3
According to Lancome, the Teint Miracle foundation could “illumi-
nate skin and make it appear glowing . . . . [by] reinforc[ing] the
skin’s radiance and improv[ing] its ability to reflect light.” 4 As for
The Eraser foundation, Maybelline stated that it “would reduce the
appearance of lines and blemishes,” including crow’s feet.5 After
viewing the advertisements, Member of Parliament Jo Swinson
1. Leo Burnett Said, “Good Advertising Does Not Just Circulate Information. It
Penetrates the Public Mind with Desires and Beliefs,” MARKETING PASSION http://
marketingpassionmarketing.blogspot.com/2009/03/leo-burnett-said-good-advertising
-does.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
2. See Cassandra A. Soltis, Cosmetic Advertisement + Photoshop = Deceptive




4. ASA Adjudication on L’Oreal (UK) Ltd, ADVER. STANDARDS AUTH. (July 27, 2011),
http://www.asa.org.uk/Rulings/Adjudications/2011/7/LOreal-(UK)-Ltd/SHP_ADJ_149640
.aspx [hereinafter ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation].
5. ASA Adjudication on L’Oreal (UK) Ltd, ADVER. STANDARDS AUTH. (July 27, 2011),
http://www.asa.org.uk/Rulings/Adjudications/2011/7/LOreal-(UK)-Ltd /SHP_ADJ_149632
.aspx [hereinafter ASA Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation].
161
162 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 19:161
complained to the ASA that the advertisements were misleading
because digital retouching techniques exaggerated the effect that
both products had on the skin of the celebrities depicted.6 In response,
Lancôme and Maybelline detailed what post-production techniques
had been applied to both ads and supplied photographs of both celeb-
rities taken at public events.7 The fact that Lancôme and Maybelline
offered photographs taken at public events to show the celebrities
in a more natural state is laughable in itself. Curiously, however, as
noted by the ASA, the companies refused to provide digitally uned-
ited versions of the ads for comparison.8 The companies also empha-
sized that they used photography techniques such as soft focus and
lighting and professional makeup artists to create the ads.9 Moreover,
Maybelline maintained that the text featured on its Eraser ad “stated
that the image was an ‘[i]llustrated effect,’” and this was a sufficient
indication that the foundations would not achieve results as dra-
matic as those depicted.10 Of course, the text was not the focus of the
ads. Furthermore, Maybelline and Lancôme claimed that the images
were “illustrative”11 and “aspirational,”12 rather than literal depic-
tions of the results a consumer could achieve.13 Because the ASA
could not, based on the information they had received, conclude that
the digital alterations to the ads had not exaggerated the effect the
products could achieve, they banned the ads in their current form.14
It is obvious that advertisements of all kinds exaggerate their
products’ effectiveness.15 However, in the case of cosmetics advertise-
ments such as these, the exaggerations (i.e., digital retouching) blur
the line between the actual, attainable effects of the product, and
6. See ASA Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation, supra note 5; ASA Adjudication
on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4; Hélène Mulholland, Lib Dems Call for Ban
on Airbrushed Photos, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk
/politics/2009/sep/19/liberal-democrats-airbrush-ban.
7. ASA Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation, supra note 5; ASA Adjudication on
Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
8. ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4; Adam Sherwin,
L’Oréal Ads Banned Over ‘Airbrushing,’ INDEPENDENT (London), July 27, 2011, http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/media/advertising/lor233al-ads-banned-over-airbrushing
-2326477.html.
9. ASA Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation, supra note 5; ASA Adjudication on
Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
10. ASA Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation, supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
13. See id.
14. ASA Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation, supra note 5; ASA Adjudication on
Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
15. See Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims: How the Law’s “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49,
54 (1998).
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“aspirational”16 results that no consumer could possibly achieve in
a much narrower context. There is no way to tell whether a model
in an anti-aging product advertisement achieved her youthful ap-
pearance by using the actual product, purely by digital airbrushing,
or by some combination of the two. At the very least, advertising reg-
ulations should demand that the product being advertised, and not
digital manipulation, is the primary cause of the result depicted. In
this Note, I will argue that United States regulatory agencies should
follow the lead of the United Kingdom’s ASA in requiring more strin-
gent standards of honesty in cosmetics advertisements.
I. THE CURRENT NATIONAL REGULATORY SCHEME
In the United States, advertising is regulated on a national level
by two authorities: the government and the advertisers themselves.17
Specifically, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigates and en-
forces federal advertising laws and regulations, and the Advertising
Self-Regulatory Council (ASRC), formerly the National Advertising
Review Council (NARC), is a self-regulating body of advertisers that
attempts to maintain truthfulness in advertising.18
A. Federal Advertising Regulation Through the FTC
The FTC is a governmental agency that regulates unfair busi-
ness competition, including false and misleading advertising claims.19
The FTC derives its authority from the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA):20 “Section 5 of the FTC Act declares unfair or deceptive
acts or practices unlawful. Section 12 specifically prohibits false ads
likely to induce the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.
16. ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
17. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, FTC (July 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm; ASRC
Snapshot, ASRC, http://www.asrcreviews.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
18. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, supra note 17; ASRC Snapshot, supra note 17; The National
Advertising Review Council Is Now the Advertising Self-Regulatory Council, ASRC
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.asrcreviews.org/the-national-advertising-review-council-is
-now-the-advertising-self-regulatory-council. For a brief outline of national advertising
law, see Advertising Law, PERS. CARE PRODS. COUNCIL, http://www.ctfa.org/advertising
-law (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
19. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, supra note 17. It is important to emphasize that the FTC reg-
ulates only the advertising of cosmetics. The FDA regulates the labeling, packaging, and
potential health consequences of the products. See FDA Authority Over Cosmetics, FDA
(Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/ucm074162.htm.
20. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
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Section 15 defines a false ad . . . as one which is ‘misleading in a
material respect.’” 21 The FTC has interpreted the FTCA as requir-
ing three elements to prove a false, misleading, or deceptive adver-
tising claim: (1) “there must be a representation, omission or practice
that is likely to mislead the consumer,” (2) the consumer’s interpre-
tation of the advertisement must be reasonable, and (3) the repre-
sentation, omission, or practice must be material.22 More recently,
deceptive advertising claims have come under the purview of the
Lanham Act when brought by one commercial competitor against
another.23 However, the FTCA remains the primary vehicle through
which ordinary consumers are protected from deceptive advertising.24
The FTC has many components, including the Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection’s Division of Advertising Practices is the, which
handles false advertising claims.25 The FTC receives consumer com-
plaints and files complaints on its own authority.26 However, it is im-
portant to note that “[t]he FTC does not resolve individual consumer
complaints,” but instead enters complaints into an online database
where other administrative and law enforcement agencies may access
them to build a case against an advertiser.27 Like other government
agencies, the FTC has the authority to bring administrative proceed-
ings, federal court actions, engage in rule-making, and issue advisory
opinions when warranted.28 In adjudications, an administrative law
21. JAMES C. MILLER, FTC, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (1983), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (responding to the Committee on Energy
and Commerce’s inquiry on the FTC’s enforcement policies).
22. Id. For a more nuanced discussion of the different types of false advertising claims,
see infra Part IV.
23. The Lanham Act primarily governs trademark infringement between commercial
competitors. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006). However, Section 43 provides that
if an advertiser “misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin
of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, [he] shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.” Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B). For a comprehensive discussion of consumers’
standing to bring false advertising claims under the Lanham Act, see James S. Wrona,
False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(A) of the Lanham Act, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 1085 (1995).
24. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-920 A, FEDERAL ADVERTISING LAW:
AN OVERVIEW 3 (1998), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams
/326.pdf.
25. David Vladeck, About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC ( Mar. 5, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm.
26. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, supra note 17.
27. Before You Submit a Complaint, FTC, https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/ (last
modified Aug. 1, 2012). In this way, the FTC’s role is in sharp contrast with the ASRC’s,
discussed below in Part B. Of course, consumers may also sue advertisers under state
advertising and consumer protection laws. My focus, however, is on national regulation.
28. FTC Actions, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/os/index.shtml (last modified June 14, 2012).
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judge may issue an order while lawsuits in federal court may result
in injunctions.29
Despite having the governmental authority to regulate decep-
tive advertising practices across all industries, the FTC relies heavily
on self-regulating agencies, such as the ASRC, to augment its en-
forcement actions.30 To date, the FTC has never brought an enforce-
ment action against a cosmetics company for enhancing the results
of its product through digital manipulation.31
B. Self-Regulation Through the ASRC
The ASRC is essentially the American counterpart to the United
Kingom’s ASA. Its board members are executives of corporations and
advertising agencies,32 and its nearly two dozen staff members are
a combination of attorneys and directors.33 The self-described goals
of the ASRC are to establish “policies and procedures for advertising
industry self-regulation,” to monitor the marketplace, and to hold
“advertisers responsible for their claims and practices and track
emerging issues and trends.” 34 Despite its self-regulating function,
however, the ASRC has close ties to the FTC.35 As one commentator
explained, the ASRC’s “rulings are respected and followed by most
advertisers because it enjoys a close relationship with the FTC, from
which it has historically drawn some of its senior staff.” 36
The ASRC is a division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus
(CBBB),37 and it has four divisions of its own: the National Advertising
29. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforce-
ment Authority, supra note 17.
30. See Advertising Trends and Consumer Protection: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., 111th Cong. (July 22, 2009) (statement of David Vladeck,
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center & Director of the Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection at the Federal Trade Commission), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=cong.
31. See also Jessica Seigel, The Lash Stand: Will New Attitudes and Regulatory
Oversight Hit Delete on Some Photo Retouching in Print Ads?, ADWEEK (May 29, 2012),
http://www.adweek.com/news/press/lash-stand-140785 (detailing the opening of a new
age of regulation for digital manipulation).
32. Supporting Advertising Industry Self-Regulation, ASRC, http://www.asrcreviews
.org/supporting-advertising-industry-self-regulation/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
33. ASRC Contact Us, ASRC, http://www.asrcreviews.org/asrc-contact-us/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2012).
34. ASRC Snapshot, supra note 17.
35. C. Lee Peeler, the President and CEO of the ASRC, previously worked at the FTC
for 33 years. ASRC Contact Us, supra note 33; C. Lee Peeler, CBBB EVP and President,
National Advertising Review Council (NARC), BBB, http://www.bbb.org/us/cbbb-staff/c
-lee-peeler/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
36. Jim Edwards, US Moves Toward Banning Photoshop in Cosmetics Ads, BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-moves-toward-banning-use
-of-photoshop-in-cosmetics-ads-2011-12.
37. ASRC Snapshot, supra note 17.
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Division (NAD), the Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU), the
Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation Program (ERSP), and the Na-
tional Advertising Review Board (NARB).38 The titles of these divi-
sions are somewhat self-explanatory: the NAD handles claims against
advertisements in general, the CARU deals with claims against ad-
vertisements directed at children,39 the ERSP regulates electronic
retailers,40 and the NARB provides independent appellate review of
the other three divisions’ rulings.41 Cosmetics products’ advertise-
ments typically fall under the purview of the NAD since they are
neither directed at children nor based primarily on electronic com-
munications.42 Therefore, we will focus on the path that a complaint
typically takes through the NAD, though the procedures are similar
for both divisions.43
Anyone may file a complaint with the NAD, including consumers,
commercial competitors, and even the NAD itself.44 Then, the NAD
determines whether to open a case.45 This determination is based on
several criteria, such as whether the advertisement is disseminated
nationally, currently in circulation or discontinued, already the sub-
ject of pending litigation, and whether the complaint has “sufficient
merit to warrant the expenditure of NAD/CARU’s resources.” 46 The
complaint must concern the truth of an advertisement rather than
matters of taste or labeling.47 If the complaint does not pass these
hurdles, the NAD informs the complainant that a case will not be
opened and may refer her to the appropriate government body.48 If,
on the other hand, the complaint comports with these requirements,
the NAD promptly forwards the complaint to the advertiser for a
response.49 In turn, the advertiser submits its response to the NAD,
38. Id.
39. About the Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU), CHILDREN’S ADVER. REVIEW
UNIT, http://www.caru.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
40. About the Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation Program (ERSP), NAT’L ADVER.
REVIEW COUNCIL, http://www.narcpartners.org/ersp/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
41. About Us—NARB, NAT’L ADVER. REVIEW BD., http://www.asrcreviews.org/category
/narb/about_narb/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
42. See Case Report Search, NAT’L ADVER. REVIEW COUNCIL, http://www.narcpartners
.org/search/searchcombo.aspx?doctype=1&casetype=1 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
43. NAT’L ADVER. REVIEW COUNCIL, THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY’S PROCESS OF VOL-
UNTARY SELF-REGULATION (2011), available at http://www.asrcreviews.org/wp-content
/uploads/2012/05/NAD-CARU-NARB-2011-Procedures-REVISED-MAY2012_4-3-12.pdf
[hereinafter THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY’S PROCESS OF VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION]
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 3–4.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. (stating that such matters are not within NAD’s mandate).
48. Id.
49. THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY’S PROCESS OF VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION, supra
note 43, at 4.
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which forwards it on to the complainant.50 Next, the complainant
may issue his response to the NAD, which again forwards it to the
advertiser.51 Once again, the advertiser responds and the NAD for-
wards its response to the complainant.52 This represents the final
exchange of responses unless the NAD requests more information
from the parties.53 After this final exchange of responses, the NAD
reviews the evidence, makes a determination, and prepares a final
case report for the parties.54 Finally, the advertiser drafts a state-
ment informing the NAD what action it intends to take with respect
to the NAD’s decision.55 If the NAD finds that the advertisement
should be modified or discontinued, and the advertiser does not com-
ply with the decision, the NAD will forward the case to the appro-
priate government agency, such as the FTC.56 After the advertiser
issues its statement, the NAD publishes the final case decision, which
either party may appeal to the NARB.57
This entire process usually takes place within sixty days due to
the strict time limits that the ASRC imposes on the parties each
step of the way.58 Parties to this process must maintain the confi-
dentiality of the investigation until its final resolution.59 All mate-
rials and data, excluding trade secrets, are submitted to the NAD and
must be made available to the other party; otherwise they will not
be considered.60 Such materials must not be shared with any non-
parties, and copies must be returned after the matter is closed.61
The NAD review process clearly strives to maintain integrity by
affording ordinary consumers an opportunity to bring false adver-
tising claims against large corporations with the help of an interme-
diary.62 Consumers avoid the extreme costs, delay, and inconvenience
of a lawsuit, instead engaging in an accelerated arbitration of sorts.63
Although the ASRC is a self-regulating agency, its decisions have
50. Id. at 5, 6.
51. Id. at 6. If the complainant fails to issue a response, NAD will decide the case based
on the record as it stands. Id.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. (stating that the NAD may or may not call a meeting between the parties).
54. Id. at 7.
55. THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY’S PROCESS OF VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION, supra
note 43, at 7.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 3–12.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. at 4–6.
61. THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY’S PROCESS OF VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION, supra
note 43, at 5.
62. See id. at 3.
63. Id. at 1.
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teeth because of its relationship to the FTC,64 and it encourages a
more voluntary atmosphere in which advertisers can act to ap-
pease consumers.65
However, we know from the advertisements we see around us,
and from the fact that so few ads are banned due to the use of dig-
ital manipulation, that neither the FTC nor the ASRC are holding
advertisers to high enough standards. The combination of the govern-
ment’s and industry’s lack of regulation on digital manipulation in
cosmetics advertisements has harmful effects on women in our so-
ciety. This combination also allows advertisers to propagate false
advertisements contrary to accepted common law doctrines and the
stated missions of agencies like the FTC and the ASRC.66
II. THE IMPACT OF MEDIA ON GENDER EQUALITY
In order to establish the harm that women suffer as a result of
the digital manipulation of ads in particular, we must first recognize
the harm women suffer from their portrayal in the media generally.
We must also recognize the effect that women’s portrayal in the media
has on the treatment of women in the real world must also be recog-
nized, for this treatment is also propagated by the digital manipula-
tion of ads.
The first of these connections is uncovered by Cheryl B. Preston
in her article Significant Bits and Pieces: Learning from Fashion
Magazines About Violence Against Women.67 In this article, Preston
discusses how women are objectified in fashion magazine advertise-
ments.68 She lists several ways in which this objectification is ac-
complished: fragmentation (the visual dismemberment of women);69
fungibility (women are interchangeable, particularly because of the
covering of their eyes);70 artificial perfection (depicting women as im-
possibly flawless, their skin free from all imperfections);71 depicting
women as dolls, masks, and mannequins (literally making them in-
animate objects rather than living, breathing individuals);72 disguise
64. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
65. ASRC Snapshot, supra note 17.
66. See infra Parts III and IV for a discussion of the common law doctrines governing
commercial speech.
67. Cheryl B. Preston, Significant Bits and Pieces: Learning from Fashion Magazines
About Violence Against Women, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1998).
68. Id. at 14–15.
69. Id. at 15–16.
70. Id. at 17.
71. Id. at 20.
72. Id. at 23.
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(portraying women through styling or costumes as animals);73 and
contortion (depicting women in either vulnerable, rather than ag-
gressive, poses, or in unnatural positions designed to cover up cer-
tain body parts of a naked woman).74
The method of objectification most relevant to our inquiry here
is “artificial perfection.” 75 Preston notes that some advertisements
go so far as to depict women “without blemishes and, in fact, usually
without pores. Their flawlessness makes them less like the viewer.
Consequently, it is easier to perceive them as commodities rather
than as people.” 76 In this way, Preston notes that even when women
are portrayed in natural poses with their faces shown, they still look
equally “inhuman”:77
The flawlessness of [advertising’s woman] is, in fact, an illusion
created by makeup artists, photographers, and photo retouchers.
Each image is painstakingly worked over: teeth and eyeballs are
bleached white; blemishes, wrinkles, and stray hairs are air-
brushed away. According to Louis Grubb, a leading New York
retoucher, “Almost every photograph you see for a national ad-
vertiser these days has been worked on by a retoucher to some
degree . . . . [F]undamentally, our job is to correct the basic
deficiencies in the original photograph or, in effect, to improve
upon the appearance of reality.” In some cases, a picture is actu-
ally an amalgam of body parts of several different models—a
mouth from this one, arms from that one, and legs from a third.
By inviting women to compare their unimproved reality with . . .
airbrushed perfection, advertising erodes self-esteem . . . .78
Cosmetics companies attempt to achieve this same “artificial
perfection” when advertising, for example, anti-aging products or
foundations such as Maybelline’s “The Eraser” and Lancome’s “Teint
Miracle.” Digital retouching in advertisements for products like these
gives women, not only an image to aspire to,79 as does every image
73. Preston, supra note 67, at 25.
74. Id. at 26–27.
75. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 21.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id. at 21 (quoting MICHAEL F. JACOBSON & LAURIE ANN MAZUR, Sexism and Sex-
uality in Advertising, in MARKETING MADNESS: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR A CONSUMER
SOCIETY 74, 75 (1995)).
79. Preston, supra note 67, at 23 (“The advertising industry . . . redefines attractiveness
to an unattainable standard. Attractiveness is fairly unusual in nature, but advertise-
ments make attractiveness seem more beautiful, perfect, and commonplace than it is in
life. These unrealistic standards lead women to believe they should also have faces with-
out blemishes or pores . . . .”).
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of a model regardless of the product being advertised,80 but also
offers them a fantasy that the advertised cosmetic product can help
them achieve the perfect skin that the object of the advertisement
“has” (but in reality, only appears to have). Advertisers should not be
permitted to substitute or augment the effects of the advertised prod-
uct with digital retouching to propagate such a harmful ideal and
blatantly lie about the product’s effectiveness. The detrimental ef-
fect on women’s self-esteem caused by artificial perfection in adver-
tisements was one of the main reasons Member of Parliament Jo
Swinson argued for the ban of the Teint Miracle and The Eraser
foundation ads.81 Swinson and her colleagues were concerned about
the continuing effect that such advertising would have on children and
teenagers.82 In particular, Swinson singled out cosmetic surgery and
eating disorders as two societal issues that she believed stemmed
from unrealistic media portrayals of women.83 Advertisers’ consis-
tent portrayal of artificially perfected women may lead to a discon-
nect and a feeling of futility for young women in their struggle to
attain the same results as the model in an ad.84 As a result, women
may develop low self-esteem, which contributes to conditions such
as eating disorders.85 Preston notes that there was a direct correla-
tion between the increase in reported cases of anorexia and bulimia
and an increase in diet-related essays and advertising in women’s
magazines.86 Stacey S. Baron similarly notes that media teaches
women at an early age “that a woman’s role in life is to be beautiful,
and that women should become beautiful at any painstaking cost.
Despite the liberating efforts of the modern women’s movement,
80. See Cassandra A. Soltis, Dying to Be a Supermodel: Can Requiring a Healthy
BMI Be Fashionable?, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 49, 70 (2009) (arguing that the
FTC should require a healthy BMI for models in advertising, or at the least public service
announcements, in order to assuage the self-esteem issues and eating disorders that wo-
men may have due to bombardment by impossibly skinny, airbrushed models.). Although
Soltis is primarily concerned with the body image issues caused by models with un-
healthy weights, she also argues that the FTC should require disclaimers on advertise-
ments where airbrushing has been performed, because the ads are misleading absent
such disclaimers. Id.




85. In fact, studies show a link between portrayals of women in the media and low
self-esteem and eating disorders. See Soltis, supra note 80, at 51; Eating Disorders: Body
Image and Advertising, HEALTHYPLACE, http://www.healthyplace.com/eating-disorders
/articles/eating-disorders-body-image-and-advertising/ (last updated July 11, 2012); Women
‘Suffer Poor Self-Esteem Due to Airbrushing in Advertising,’ TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 27,
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/6662958/Women-suffer-poor-self-esteem
-due-to-airbrushing-in-advertising.html.
86. Preston, supra note 67, at 67.
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society at large still determines a woman’s self worth by her ability
to attract a man.” 87
The harm is not only psychological, and it does not only affect
women’s treatment of themselves. Studies show that the cultural
objectification of women may contribute to the violent crimes com-
mitted against them,88 as well as to other issues they may face, such
as workplace discrimination and harassment.89 These studies sug-
gest that repeatedly viewing women in their media portrayal as hy-
persexualized objects to be dominated may foster an environment
where violence and discrimination against women is tolerated at the
least, and encouraged at the worst.90
The “artificial perfection” of women in advertisements, although
more subtle than posing women in unnatural or submissive posi-
tions, is merely another means of objectifying women by suggesting
that they are less than human.91 Preston notes that:
A culminating motif in advertising is . . . that . . . [women] can
be physically overcome . . . . This invitation to be victimized and
abused is intimated in each of the [objectification] motifs dis-
cussed above. The perception of a passivity that allows violence
is, of course, a natural by-product of both objectification and ar-
tificial beauty.92
She also suggests that objectification is coincidental to dehumani-
zation, which leads to violence against the perceived object in war,
prison settings, and in the minds of rapists.93
Indeed, for the digital retoucher himself the model is an object
on a computer screen to be stripped of its imperfections, and there-
fore its individuality.94 He may believe that he is distilling pure
beauty from the image, but he is instead sapping the model of her
humanity.95 As noted above, pores, the most readily identifiable trait
of authentic human skin, become undesirable.96 The skin should
87. Stacey S. Baron, Note, (Un)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal (De)Construction of
Female Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359, 380–81 (2005).
88. See Tamara R. Piety, Onslaught: Commercial Speech and Gender Inequality, 60
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 47, 77 (2009).
89. See Britain A. Scott & Sidney W. Scott, Dirty Business: Women Managing Sexual
Objectification in the Workplace, in 3 GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN THE WORKPLACE
43, 49–51 (Margaret Foegen Karsten ed., 2006).
90. Piety, supra note 88, at 77; see Scott & Scott, supra note 89, at 49–51.
91. Preston, supra note 67, at 29.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 21.
95. See id.
96. Id.
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instead appear as smooth and blemish-free as plastic.97 The desirabil-
ity of a youthful appearance is one thing, but a longing for the impos-
sibly perfect, unnatural skin depicted in an advertisement is another
matter entirely.98 It is particularly disturbing that advertisers create
these harmful “aspirational” images in order to sell a product.99
Moreover, recent research suggests that the objectification of
women in advertising contributes to sexism.100 Tamara R. Piety
notes that:
Women continue to make less money than men do in the same
jobs. They continue to experience disparate burdens with respect
to housework and childrearing. Women are overrepresented in
lower status jobs within the same professions and job categories
with men and are underrepresented in politics and in the upper
echelons of management.101
Objectification leads to commodification, and “[c]ommodification rein-
forces women’s status as subordinate.”102 Men adopt these viewpoints,
whether consciously or subconsciously, through the constant bom-
bardment of hypersexualized, fragmented, and submissive models
in advertisements.103 Piety describes a study in which men who were
“primed with images from advertising depicting women as sexual
objects . . . . engaged in more sexist behavior with female test inter-
view subjects, and reflected lower evaluations of women’s compe-
tency than did a control group of men who . . . had not been ‘primed’
by the advertising materials.”104 Another study “found that the males
who had viewed the ads portraying women as sex objects” demon-
strated “acceptance of what the researchers called ‘rape acceptance
myths’ . . . [suggesting] that exposure to ads that portray women as
sex objects increases some men’s willingness to commit or tolerate
violence against women.”105
Studies such as these bring the issue of advertising’s effect on
women’s self-esteem to a much more external and dangerous effect;
97. For more discussion of the portrayal of women as plastic, see Preston, supra
note 67, at 25.
98. See id. at 23.
99. ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
100. See Piety, supra note 88, at 54–55.
101. Id. at 50–51 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 55.
103. See id. at 75.
104. Id. at 75–76.
105. Id. at 77 (citations omitted) (quoting Kyra Lanis & Katherine Covell, Images of
Women in Advertisements: Effects on Attitudes Related to Sexual Aggression, 32 SEX
ROLES 639, 646 (1995)); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 89, at 48–54 (discussing a
study in which male subjects became less concerned with violence against women after
viewing pornography repeatedly).
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men who consume these advertising images are more likely to adopt
the derogatory viewpoints expressed by those images. The images
promote the importance of beauty, submissiveness, and sexualiza-
tion of women, while at the same time downplaying any other traits
that a woman might have, such as intelligence, managerial compe-
tence, assertiveness, et cetera.106 Moreover, the ads suggest that the
essence of a woman is only that which is portrayed, and, by impli-
cation, that anything else a woman might be is unwomanly or un-
usual.107 We see what happens when men in positions of power
adopt such a philosophy: discrimination in salary, in promotions,
and sexual harassment.108
The effect that advertising has on women’s views of themselves
and men’s views of women is only half of the cycle. The other half is
adroitly demonstrated by Preston’s point that advertisers do not
spend billions of dollars to present a new and potentially objection-
able ideology—they present the ideology that their research shows
consumers respond to and identify with.109 In this way, advertising
and societal views of gender roles reinforce each other.
The way to break this cycle is to show advertisers that consumers
are fed up with the ideology of women portrayed in advertisements.110
The way to express this disapproval to advertisers, however, is two-
fold. Preston suggests a basic market-controlled approach. Women,
as the majority of consumers, should simply refuse to purchase goods
sold by companies who propagate negative portrayals of women in
their advertisements.111 Although theory such an approach would
work, so many companies sell so many products by objectifying women
that women cannot realistically turn elsewhere for the products they
need or want.112 In fact, studies suggesting how advertising reinforces
gender roles and negative portrayals of women—and alongside them,
calls to boycott advertisers—have been around for over two decades.113
Nevertheless, the objectification of women in advertisements has ac-
tually increased.114 This is precisely the reason that I propose starting
106. See Scott & Scott, supra note 89, at 50.
107. See Preston, supra note 67, at 22.
108. Scott & Scott, supra note 89, at 54.
109. Preston, supra note 67, at 75–76.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Whether women should want or need these products (i.e., makeup) is another
element of the cycle entirely. The difficulty is that a boycott of such products cannot suc-
ceed because women’s desire for those products cannot disappear overnight.
113. See, e.g., Lanis & Covell, supra note 105, at 646–48.
114. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 67, at 48 (“In a study published in 1995, researchers
concluded that, although women are now depicted in a ‘wider range of social and
occupational roles, . . . there has been a parallel increase in the sexually exploitive use
of women in advertisements.’”(quoting Lanis & Covell, supra note 105, at 640)).
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with a small, but effective, step in the right direction and to accom-
plish this step through legal reform, rather than reform based purely
on moral principles. Prohibiting artificial perfection in advertise-
ments, while far from eradicating objectification of women, would,
at least on a micro level, begin to bring advertisements’ depiction of
women more in line with the way women look in real life. Though
such a measure would not immediately affect the objectification of
women through posing, nudity, fragmentation, etcetera, it would
begin to counteract the literal objectification of women by making
them look more realistic, more human, and less like plastic dolls to be
dominated. Rehumanizing women in this way—from the ground up,
from the pores—is the first step toward changing the way women
are viewed.
Piety also suggests that granting brands the right to constitu-
tionally protected free speech for their advertisements propagates
gender inequality by removing restrictions on advertisements.115
Thus, corporations and their brands are given more leeway to depict
women in their advertisements without fear of governmental in-
trusion.116 Because women are traditionally objectified and regula-
tion of these depictions is limited, one way we can attack traditional
depictions of women in the media is to combat them through the
common-law doctrines of fraud, as well as through the FTC and NAD
under misleading advertising claims.
Although we can never outlaw the portrayal of women as ob-
jects in the media is impossible without violating the constitutional
right to free speech, we can use the more limited application of decep-
tive advertising claims to diminish advertisers’ ability to propagate
these harmful portrayals of women. At the very least, we can prohibit
cosmetics companies from depicting “artificial perfection,” which is
the result of digital retouching, rather than the actual results of their
products. In this way, we can foster more literal truth in advertising
while, at the same time, taking a sound step toward reversing the
harmful societal trend of objectifying women. Over time, this will
reduce the violence and discrimination against women and assuage
the psychological harm done to them by providing women with more
realistic images to which they can aspire.117
In fact, recent trends in legal decisions suggest that a measure
prohibiting artificial perfection of models in advertisements, at least
115. Piety, supra note 88, at 90–91.
116. See id.
117. Again, this is only a small step in the right direction. Much harm is still done by
forcing women to aspire to the image of a made-up woman at all. Ultimately, cosmetics
companies have the right to advertise their products, but at least we can improve the
way in which they do so.
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where digital retouching provides the results that the advertiser pur-
ports the product to deliver, is likely to be well received in the near
future.118 In her Note (Un)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal (De)Con-
struction of Female Beauty,119 Stacey S. Baron discusses a progres-
sive trend in court decisions on appearance-based discrimination
claims.120 Baron cites a 2003 California Court of Appeal case Yano-
witz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,121 to demonstrate this emerging trend.122
The Yanowitz case stemmed from the manager of a L’Oreal makeup
counter ordering one of his female employees to fire another female
employee for not being attractive enough, according to the manager’s
own standards, to work the counter.123 The manager had expressed his
preference for thinner, lighter-skinned, and “hotter” blonde women.124
The manager then fired the female employee for failing to fire the
allegedly unattractive employee.125 The court held that it was sex dis-
crimination for the manager to fire an employee for not being physi-
cally attractive enough according to his personal standards.126 The
court noted that the manager presumably would not have held a
male employee to the same standards.127
Baron notes that this case decision is in line with the decision
in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.,128 but it contrasts sharply with
that in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.129 In Wilson, the court rejected an
airline’s claim that flight attendants had to be attractive.130 Instead,
the court found that attractiveness was merely a “business conve-
nience,” not a “business necessity.”131 By contrast, in Craft a female
news anchor sued the news station over her firing, claiming that the
station’s “appearance standards were based on stereotypical charac-
terizations of the sexes and were applied to women more constantly
and vigorously than they were applied to men.”132 The court rejected
the anchor’s claim, finding that the news station’s “standards were
the product of professional and technical considerations, making
118. See also, e.g., Baron, supra note 87, at 374–75 (discussing a successful recent
California decision on an appearance-based discrimination claim).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., id. at 374–75.
121.  Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
122. Baron, supra note 87, at 374–75.
123. Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582; Baron, supra note 87, at 374–75.
124. Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582; Baron, supra note 87, at 374–75.
125. Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582; Baron, supra note 87, at 374–75.
126. Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587; Baron, supra note 87, at 375.
127. Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587; Baron, supra note 87 at 375.
128. 517 F. Supp. 292, 303 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Baron, supra note 87, at 372–75.
129. 766 F.2d 1205, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 1985); Baron, supra note 87, at 372–75.
130. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303.
131. Id.
132. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210.
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them reasonable business qualifications.”133 Baron, however, notes
that the trend is in favor of decisions like that in Yanowitz, which
signals courts’ increasing cognizance of discrimination based on
women’s appearance.134
III. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINES OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Generally, advertising is commercial speech.135 The seminal
case in commercial speech doctrine is Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.136 In this case, plaintiff-
consumers brought suit against the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
alleging that a Virginia statute which declared it unprofessional con-
duct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription
drugs was unconstitutional on free speech grounds.137 The district
court had declared the statute void.138
According to the Court, if a licensed pharmacist was found to
have violated the statute, he would be “subject to a civil monetary
penalty, or to revocation or suspension of his license.”139 The Court
noted that, at the time of this case, because only licensed pharma-
cists could dispense prescription drugs in the state, “advertising or
other affirmative dissemination of prescription drug price informa-
tion is effectively forbidden.”140 Plaintiff-consumers argued that they
would benefit from the free advertising of prescription drug prices
because the prices for the same drugs varied greatly from pharmacy
to pharmacy even within the same locality.141 The Court also noted
that this case was distinguishable from previous cases about the
advertising of prescription drug prices because earlier cases were
brought by pharmacists and this case was brought by consumers.142
The Court found that plaintiffs’ cause was legitimate because free-
dom of speech applies equally to the speaker and to the recipients.143
Acknowledging, however, that its previous rulings had left many
with the impression that commercial speech (i.e., advertising) was
133. Baron, supra note 87, at 374.
134. See id. at 372.
135. I discuss the definition of “commercial speech” in much greater detail in this
section.
136. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
137. Id. at 749–50.
138. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683,
687 (E.D. Va. 1974).
139. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 752.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 753–54.
142. Id. at 755.
143. Id. at 756–57.
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not protected by the First Amendment, the Court stated that it
needed to clarify its position on the matter.144 Quoting its opinion in
Bigelow v. Virginia,145 the Court emphasized that its earlier decisions
“merely upheld ‘a reasonable regulation of the manner in which com-
mercial advertising could be distributed.’”146 The Court also noted that
“‘the Virginia courts erred in their assumptions that advertising, as
such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection.’”147 According
to the Court in Bigelow, simply because speech is commercial does
not mean that it is “valueless in the marketplace of ideas,”148 and
therefore not deserving of First Amendment protection.149
Yet, the Court also acknowledged that in Bigelow it did not need
to determine “the precise extent to which the First Amendment
permits regulation of advertising.”150 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, on
the other hand, required the Court to determine that extent. The
Court stated:
It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amend-
ment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid
advertisement of one form or another . . . . Speech likewise is
protected even though it is carried in a form that is “sold” for
profit, and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase
or otherwise pay or contribute money.
If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First
Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its
content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection
cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject . . . . Nor can it
be dispositive that a commercial advertisement is noneditorial,
and merely reports a fact. Purely factual matter of public interest
may claim protection.
Our question is whether speech which does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction,” is so removed from any “expo-
sition of ideas,” and from “‘truth, science, morality, and arts in gen-
eral . . .’” that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not.151
The Court proceeded to break down the dynamics of a transaction
involving commercial speech.152 First, there is the advertiser, whose
144. Id. at 758–59.
145. 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759–60.
146. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 760 (quoting Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826).
148. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
149. Id.
150. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760 (quoting Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825).
151. Id. at 761–62 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 762.
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interest is purely economic.153 This interest does not disqualify the
advertiser from First Amendment protection.154 On the other hand,
there is the consumer, who has an interest in the free flow of com-
mercial information.155 The Court noted that withholding prescrip-
tion drug information harms the poor, the sick, and the elderly in
particular because these groups spend a large amount of money on
prescription drugs, yet the prohibition on advertising the prices of
those drugs prevents these consumers from making informed pur-
chasing decisions.156
The Court then extended the scope of its inquiry, finding that
even in less dire cases society in general “may have a strong interest
in the free flow of commercial information.”157 Then, even more boldly,
the Court declared that perhaps “no line between publicly ‘interesting’
or ‘important’ commercial advertising and the opposite kind could
ever be drawn”158 because:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enter-
prise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is
a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of com-
mercial information is indispensable . . . . Therefore, even if the
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument
to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not
say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.159
Thus, the Court took the opportunity afforded to it by consumers’
alleged interest in prescription drug price information to declare
that all advertising serves a legitimate public purpose and is there-
fore protected by the First Amendment. With regard to the case at
hand, the Court held that the consumers’ interest in receiving the
price information outweighed the State’s interest in “maintaining a
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 763.
156. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–64. The Court also noted that in this
context pricing information is not merely a “convenience,” but “could mean the allevia-
tion of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.” Id. at 764.
157. Id. at 764.
158. Id. at 765.
159. Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
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high degree of professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists.”160
The Court in large part based its decision on two beliefs: first, its be-
lief that even if the pharmacists were allowed to advertise prices of
prescription drugs, other state provisions ensured that the quality
of their care would remain unaffected;161 and second, that the First
Amendment requires the free flow of information in order to help
people make informed decisions.162 In contrast, the current system
was one in which the people were kept in ignorance of prices and
therefore of how their money would be best spent.163
The Court emphasized that its holding that commercial speech
is protected by the First Amendment did not mean that commer-
cial speech can never be regulated.164 The Court stated, “[t]he First
Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from
insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as
well as freely.”165 The Court also noted that “a different degree of pro-
tection is necessary [for commercial speech] to insure that the flow
of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.”166
The Court also suggested that the special considerations for com-
mercial speech “may also make it appropriate to require that a com-
mercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional
information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent
its being deceptive.”167 Thus, we see in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy the foundations of the tension between First Amendment pro-
tection for, and regulation of, commercial speech.168 However, in
all of the false advertising tests that come later, the premise that
the Court set out in this case remains the highest concern: that
160. Id. at 766. The Board argued for the State’s interest by asserting that free ad-
vertising of prescription drug prices would lead to competitive pricing between phar-
macies, and as a result lead to pharmacists employing cost-cutting measures that
jeopardized the quality of their drugs and services. Id. at 767–68. As a result, the more
“conscientious pharmacist” would be forced to engage in the same cost-cutting practices
or risk going out of business. Id. However, the Court reasoned that strict regulations on
pharmacists would prevent the decline in quality of care that the Board felt certain
would ensue. Id. at 768.
161. Id. at 766–70.
162. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
163. Id. at 770.
164. Id. at 770–72.
165. Id. at 771–72 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 771 n.24.
167. Id. at 772.
168. Chief Justice Burger observes that “the differences between commercial price and
product advertising . . . and ideological communication allow the State a scope in
regulating the former that would be unacceptable under the First Amendment with
respect to the latter.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 774. (C.J. Burger,
concurring) (citations and quotations omitted).
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consumers are able to access information that helps them make well-
informed decisions.169
Several years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York, the Supreme Court set out
a test for determining when the First Amendment protected com-
mercial speech.170 Recognizing the factors of key import in Virginia
State Board and subsequent cases, the Court came up with the fol-
lowing four-step inquiry: (1) the commercial speech must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the asserted government
interest in restricting the speech must be substantial; (3) the regu-
lation must directly advance the government interest asserted; and
(4) the regulation must not be more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.171 This test is known as the Central Hudson
test.172 These four factors once again balance the State’s interest in
restricting commercial speech against the public’s interest in receiv-
ing accurate information.
However, in order to better understand precisely what consti-
tutes “commercial speech,” we must look to yet another Supreme
Court case, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.173 Bolger set out
the most commonly used test for determining whether or not a par-
ticular message counts as commercial speech.174 In Bolger, the Court
listed three factors, none of which is sufficient on its own, to estab-
lish that a message constitutes commercial speech: (1) the message
is an advertisement, (2) the message references a specific product,
and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation for disseminating
the information.175 This is known as the Bolger test.176
IV. WHY MAKEUP ADS ARE A LOGICAL FIRST STEP
Makeup ads are a logical first step in imposing stricter regula-
tions on advertisements because they provide a strictly legal ground—
misleading commercial speech under the Bolger and Central Hudson
tests—on which consumers can seek redress and we can begin to cast
out idealistic images of women from the media.177
169. See id. at 765.
170. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
171. Id.
172. See Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?,
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 390–91 (2011).
173. See 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
174. See Cortez, supra note 172, at 393.
175. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67.
176. See Cortez, supra note 172, at 393.
177. I would like to emphasize once again, the regulations proposed in this note are
intended to be merely a first step in the right direction.
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As described above, makeup advertisements that employ digital
retouching to exaggerate the effects of their products perpetuate
and reinforce the societal notion that women should look a certain
way (namely, like the model in the ad) and use makeup to achieve
that look.178 Digital retouching, however, makes the cycle worse by
depicting “results” that no woman could possibly attain in the non-
cyber world.179 Therefore, makeup advertisements, such as those
banned in the United Kingdom, wrong women in two ways. On a
psychological level, the advertisements set the consumer up for fail-
ure because the makeup product will literally never look as good on
them as it does on the model in the advertisement; then, on a more
tangible, ordinary level, the advertisements mislead the consumer
about how effective the product is.180 It is this second level which can
offer women a remedy in the law because the wrong in the latter case
is tangible, even financial, rather than merely psychological.
If we apply the Bolger test to cosmetics advertisements, we find
that they overwhelmingly meet the three factors: (1) they are ad-
vertisements; (2) they reference a specific product; and (3) the
speaker (i.e., the company) has an economic motivation for dissem-
inating them.
More importantly, if we apply Central Hudson test to my pro-
posed regulations on depictions of product results in cosmetic adver-
tisements, the proposed regulations meet the requirements of the
common law test.181 If we take for granted that advertisements such
as those for the Teint Miracle182 and Eraser183 are misleading, they
do not even meet the threshold inquiry of the Central Hudson test,
and as such are not protected by the First Amendment and there-
fore can be restricted extensively. This once again goes back to the
foundational principle in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that
commercial speech must be accurate so as to help the consumer
make an informed decision.184 Cosmetics advertisements that use
178. See Preston, supra note 67, at 20–23.
179. See Women ‘Suffer Poor Self-Esteem Due to Airbrushing in Advertising,’ supra
note 85.
180. See, e.g., ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4; ASA
Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation, supra note 5; Preston, supra note 67, at 23.
181. For ease of reference, the Central Hudson test states that in order to be fully pro-
tected under the First Amendment: (1) The commercial speech must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading; (2) the asserted government interest in restricting the speech must
be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the government interest asserted;
and (4) the regulation must not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
182. See ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
183. See ASA Adjudication on The Eraser Foundation, supra note 5.
184. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976).
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digital manipulation to replace or to augment the actual product’s
effects do not help the consumer make an informed decision because
they do not depict the actual product’s results; they are merely
illustrative or “aspirational.”185
Nevertheless, in order to proceed through the Central Hudson
test, we will presume for the moment that either these advertise-
ments are not misleading because they inform the consumer by show-
ing “illustrative” results, or that there are more borderline cases
where the digital manipulation is not as extreme. If we make such a
presumption, the advertisements would meet the first requirement
of the Central Hudson test because buying makeup is lawful and,
suspending reality, the ads are not misleading. We would then pro-
ceed to the next step of the test.
The next step is to determine whether the asserted government
interest in restricting the speech is substantial. Based on the studies
and concerns discussed above,186 the government has a substantial
interest in regulating advertisements that objectify women and cre-
ate impossible ideals for women to aspire to (i.e., having flawless,
pore-less skin), thereby causing, in the aggregate, an increase in low
self-esteem, eating disorders, sexual harassment, gender discrimina-
tion, and violent crimes against women. Further, the more limited
application of this regulation that is proposed in this Note meets the
third and fourth requirements of the Central Hudson test, which
state that: (3) the regulation must directly advance the government
interest asserted; and (4) the regulation must not be more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.187
I do not propose banning all advertisements that objectify women
or perfect them artificially regardless of the product being adver-
tised.188 Instead, the government should restrict cosmetics adver-
tisers to using images that capture the actual results of the product
advertised, rather than the results of digital manipulation. Such reg-
ulations would directly advance a government interest while being
only as narrow as is necessary to advance that interest. The interest
is two-fold: protecting women from the harms described above and
protecting consumers from advertisements that do not accurately
depict the results of the product. This proposed regulation meets the
185. ASA Adjudication on Teint Miracle Foundation, supra note 4.
186. See supra Part II.
187. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
188. At least, not as a first step. In order to comply with the Central Hudson test and
to give the proposed regulations the highest possible chance of success, the regulations
I would tailor them as narrowly as possible to start with, such that there would need to
be a correlation between the digital manipulation and the product being advertised.
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requirements of the fourth factor of the test by limiting regulation to
as narrow a class of advertisements as possible: cosmetics advertise-
ments that (1) depict women, (2) employ digital manipulation and/or
artificial perfection, (3) in order to amplify the results of the product
that is being advertised, (4) to such an extent that an average con-
sumer cannot distinguish the difference between the actual results
of the product and the digital augmentation of those results with the
naked eye.
In this way, my proposed regulations would meet the require-
ments of the Central Hudson test even if the advertisements
themselves were not deemed misleading. Nevertheless, because
the regulations have a better chance of approval the more narrowly
tailored they are, I would propose the same regulations even if the
advertisements were determined to be misleading in the first place.
Now we return to the presumption that cosmetics advertise-
ments such as those for the Teint Miracle and Eraser Foundation
are misleading. It will be established that that presumption is true
by taking a closer look at how the courts view false or misleading
advertising claims.
There are three categories of false advertising claims: “false,”
that is, literally false; “misleading”; and “false by necessary impli-
cation.”189 Sarah Samuelson explains the difference between “mis-
leading” and “false by necessary implication” as follows:
Under the “false by necessary implication” doctrine, courts ex-
amine the context of the full advertisement, rather than looking
at the claim in isolation. Claims that appear to be facially true,
but are “false by necessary implication,” are then treated as if
they are literally false. Therefore, courts may order removal of
“false by necessary implication” advertisements without consid-
ering extrinsic evidence of consumer deception (as they would for
misleading claims) . . . . A “misleading” claim is usually one that
seems to be true on its face, but may convey other meanings that
are false . . . . In such a case, the parties must provide survey
evidence showing whether consumers were actually misled, and
the court’s decision generally turns on this evidence.190
A semblance of the “false by necessary implication” doctrine seems
to be what Jo Swinson and the ASA applied to the Teint Miracle and
189. Sarah Samuelson, Note, True or False: The Expanding “False by Necessary Im-
plication” Doctrine in Lanham Act False Advertising, and How a Revitalized Puffery
Defense Can Solve This Problem, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 317, 318 (2008) (naming three cat-
egories of false advertising claims).
190. Id. at 320–21.
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The Eraser advertisements. Although the fine print may have dis-
tinguished certain features of the photographs as an “[i]llustrative
[e]ffect,”191 the very fact that the photographs were being used to ad-
vertise foundations that reduced the appearance of lines and wrin-
kles or created a glowing undertone implied that the effects in the
photographs were the result of the use of that product. Notably, as
Samuelson explained, in contrast to traditional “misleading” adver-
tising claims in which the Court considers extrinsic marketing
research to determine how consumers actually perceived the ad-
vertisement, in “false by necessary implication” claims, the Court
does not require evidence that consumers actually interpreted the
advertisement in the misleading way.192 This element of the doctrine
in particular helps raise the claim above the threshold of what
might be common sense, but certainly should not be: namely, that
cosmetics companies routinely digitally retouch their advertise-
ments in order to exaggerate the actual effects that a product might
have on the consumer. In reality, most women probably know that
advertisements are digitally retouched.193 However, the issue is that
the retouching makes it impossible to distinguish between what is
real and what is false—between what is the actual result of the
product and what is the result of computer wizardry. Further, the
deeper issue is that depictions of artificially perfected women are
harmful on a psychological, physical, and societal level.194 By relying
on this application of the false by necessary implication doctrine, my
proposed regulations would pass the “common sense” test.
Incorporating this latest doctrine of false advertising, a final
statement of my proposed regulation would be: cosmetics advertise-
ments that (1) depict women, (2) employ digital manipulation and/or
artificial perfection, (3) in order to amplify the results of the product
that is being advertised, (4) to such an extent that an average con-
sumer cannot distinguish the difference between the actual results
of the product and the digital augmentation of those results with the
naked eye are deemed to be false by necessary implication.
CONCLUSION
Imposing stricter regulations on cosmetics products advertise-
ments can help us rehabilitate women’s place in society as coequals
191. See ASA Adjudication on the Eraser Foundation, supra note 5.
192. Samuelson, supra note 189, at 330.
193. See, e.g., Sara Benincasa, I’m Shocked! Beauty Ads Lie?, CNN OPINION (July 30,
2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/07/30/benincasa.ads.uk/index.html.
194. See supra Part II.
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and create more honesty in advertising by limiting makeup adver-
tisements to using images that capture the results of their actual
product. While we cannot completely eradicate the sexist images of
women in the media, the unattainable standards promulgated by
these media by using existing legal remedies to ban advertisements
that are false by necessary implication due to digital manipulation.
By relying on long-standing Supreme Court decisions like Vir-
ginia State Board,195 Central Hudson,196 and Bolger,197 we can ensure
that proposed regulations have a solid legal basis in the common
law. By combining accepted commercial speech doctrines with emerg-
ing studies and growing concerns about the negative effect of the
media on women, we can propose legislation that is lawful, popular,
and ethically appealing.198 New regulations on cosmetics advertising,
such as the ones I propose,199 that meet these criteria have a reason-
able chance of success in the near future—especially if our regula-
tory agencies take note of how the United Kingdom’s ASA handled
the Lancôme and Maybelline advertisements.200 Whether the new
regulations must be forced on advertisers by the FTC depends on
the ASRC’s willingness to increase its advertising standards of its
own accord.
In fact, changes are already beginning to manifest in the NAD’s
self-regulation. In December the NAD banned a CoverGirl mascara
ad featuring musician Taylor Swift because the ad used excessive
Photoshopping.201 The NAD explicitly stated that in doing so, it was
195. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
196. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of N.Y., 446 U.S. 557
(1980).
197. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
198. Many others have been calling for years for the same type of reform that I pro-
pose here. One of the most recent proposals, dating to October 2011, is the Self Esteem
Act by Seth and Eva Matlins. The Self Esteem Act does not seek to make advertisements
more honest by limiting digital manipulation, as my proposal does, but merely to make
the advertisements more honest by requiring disclaimers that the models have been dig-
itally altered. Off Our Chests, The Self-Esteem Act, FEEL MORE BETTER (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://www.feelmorebetter.com/the-self-esteem-act/. See also Tamara Abraham, The Self
Esteem Act: Parents Push for Anti-Photoshop Law in U.S. to Protect Teens from Unrealistic
Body Image Ideals, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 12, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk
/femail/article-2048375/Self-Esteem-Act-US-parents-push-anti-Photoshop-laws
-advertising.html. A similar bill was just recently proposed in Arizona. See Arizona
Considers Anti-Photoshop Law, PDNPULSE (Feb. 23, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://pdnpulse.com
/category/photo-manipulation.
199. See supra Part IV (laying out my proposed regulations in detail).
200. Benincasa, supra note 193.
201. See Lindsey Hunter Lopez, Taylor Swift’s CoverGirl Ad Pulled, CNN: THE MARQUEE
BLOG (Dec. 21, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://marquee.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/21/taylor-swifts
-covergirl-ad-pulled/?hpt=hp_c2.
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following the lead of the ASA decisions in the United Kingdom.202
The fact that the advertisement contained a disclaimer that the
model’s eyelashes were digitally enhanced in post-production was
not enough to prevent the NAD from banning it, just as Maybelline
and Lancome’s claims that the results of their products were “il-
lustrative” and “aspirational” were not enough to prevent the ASA
from banning those advertisements.203 After the decision, Andrea
Levine, NAD’s director stated, “You can’t use a photograph to dem-
onstrate how a cosmetic will look after it is applied to a woman’s
face and then—in the mice type— have a disclosure that says ‘okay,
not really.’” 204
One can only hope that the NAD’s decision in this instance rep-
resents an enduring change in attitude that narrows the acceptable
use of digital manipulation and artificial perfection in cosmetics ad-
vertisements, paving the way for fiercer federal regulations.
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